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CRIMINALIZING THE TRANSMISSION OF HIV: CONSENT,
DISCLOSURE, AND ONLINE DATING
Alexandra McCallum*
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) was first recognized as a
widespread public health problem, policymakers and legal scholars have
considered how criminal law should be used to influence the sexual behavior of
people with HIV. 1 Surely, HIV is a problem that affects the general health, safety,
and welfare of citizens. Thus, as most cases of HIV are transmitted through sexual
conduct, 2 states can regulate this conduct pursuant to their police powers. 3
Generally, states that criminalize the transmission of HIV through sexual conduct
provide an exception for HIV-positive individuals who disclose their status4 and
obtain consent 5 from their partners. However, these statutes tend to be drafted
broadly and contain ambiguous disclosure and consent language.
The ambiguities surrounding the consent and disclosure exceptions pose novel
problems for HIV-positive online daters. Internet dating sites provide a unique
medium for an individual to contextually communicate his or her serostatus. 6 This
raises a question: Within the meaning of the transmission statutes, does
* © 2014 Alexandra McCallum, J.D. 2014, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College
of Law. I would like to thank the Utah Law Review staff for all their hard work and input.
1
Sarah J. Newman, Prevention, Not Prejudice: The Role of Federal Guidelines in
HIV-Criminalization Reform, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1403, 1408 (2013) (“The criminalization
of HIV exposure has . . . received considerable treatment in legal scholarship.”).
2
Zita Lazzarini et al., Evaluating the Impact of Criminal Laws on HIV Risk Behavior,
30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 239, 239 (2002).
3
See id. at 241.
4
E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11(B)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (“No person,
with knowledge that the person has tested positive as a carrier of a virus that causes
[AIDS], shall knowingly . . . [e]ngage in sexual conduct with another person without
disclosing that knowledge to the other person prior to engaging in the sexual conduct.”).
5
E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24(2) (West 2007) (“It is unlawful for any person who
has human immunodeficiency virus infection, when such person knows he or she is
infected with this disease and when such person has been informed that he or she may
communicate this disease to another person through sexual intercourse, to have sexual
intercourse with any other person, unless such other person has been informed of the
presence of the sexually transmissible disease and has consented to the sexual
intercourse.”).
6
Serostatus is defined as follows: “The state of either having or not having detectable
antibodies against a specific antigen, as measured by a blood test (serologic test). For
example, HIV seropositive means that a person has detectable antibodies to HIV;
seronegative means that a person does not have detectable HIV antibodies.” Education
Materials, AIDSINFO, http://www.aidsinfo.nih.gov/education-materials/glossary/search/sero
status (last updated Mar. 12, 2014).
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communicating serostatus nonverbally constitute disclosure? Can an HIV-positive
individual assume he or she obtained partner consent by displaying serostatus on
an online profile? Relatedly, can the nature of the dating site itself—for example, a
site for HIV-positive individuals—serve as disclosure and create a presumption of
consent? Unfortunately, these answers are unknown. The behavioral complexities
inherent in negotiating disclosure and consent, 7 coupled with assumptions about
Internet dating community norms, increase the likelihood that good-faith mistakes
will occur. However, the current state statutory scheme does not punish according
to a defendant’s degree of culpability. 8
Part II of this Note briefly tracks the history of criminal statutes specific to
HIV transmission. It also surveys the statutes that criminalize sexual transmission
of HIV but provide exceptions for consent and disclosure. Lastly, Part II surveys
the world of online dating and the reasons why e-dating may be particularly
attractive to those living with HIV. Part III looks at the inherent flaws in state
disclosure and consent provisions and raises substantive-due-process concerns
relative to these flaws. Next, the analysis section provides four scenarios—the first
three demonstrate how assumptions about online community norms increase the
opportunity for good-faith mistakes, and the fourth presents a scenario where
substantive-due-process rights may be implicated. Lastly, this Note presents a
model statute and jury instruction that aim to address these problems.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part briefly surveys the United States’s legal response to the HIV
epidemic. Next, it looks at the statutes that criminalize sexual transmission of HIV
but provide specific exceptions for consent and disclosure. Lastly, this Part
explores the world of online dating and the reasons why e-dating may attract those
living with HIV.
A. The Legal Response to HIV
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is caused by HIV, a virus
that is transmitted through sexual fluids, blood, and breast milk. 9 The virus was
first discovered among homosexual males in California and New York in 1981. 10
As reported cases of HIV escalated and researchers gained a better scientific
7

Scott Burris et al., Do Criminal Laws Influence HIV Risk Behavior? An Empirical
Trial, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 467, 469 (2007) (describing sex as a complex behavior where
“[HIV] disclosure and safe sex are negotiated non-verbally and contextually”).
8
Margo Kaplan, Rethinking HIV-Exposure Crimes, 87 IND. L.J. 1517, 1532–33
(2012).
9
Can You Get HIV From . . . ?, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/can-you-get-hiv.htm
(last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
10
Origins of HIV & AIDS, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/origin-hiv-aids.htm (last
visited Mar. 19, 2014); History of AIDS Up to 1986, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/history-a
ids-1986.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
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understanding of the virus, policymakers took initiatives to address the growing
epidemic. In September 1987, President Reagan created the Presidential
Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic to advise the White
House on the public health dangers resulting from the spread of HIV/AIDS. 11 One
year later, the commission released a report on its findings and encouraged states
to examine the possible need for criminal statutes specific to HIV transmission. 12
Further, by conditioning federal funding for HIV/AIDS prevention programs on
the ability of state criminal laws to effectively prosecute the knowing transfer of
HIV, the 1990 Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act
imposed further pressure on states to criminalize the transmission of HIV. 13 By
1993 nearly half of the states had criminal statutes that targeted HIV transmission
in some way. 14
B. HIV-Specific Transmission Statutes That Target Consensual Sexual Conduct
and Provide Disclosure and Consent Exceptions
Presently, twenty-four states have criminal statutes that target HIV-infected
individuals who—while aware of their HIV-positive status—knowingly engage in
consensual sexual relations. 15 These statutes differ in construction with respect to
how disclosure of one’s HIV-positive status and partner consent are addressed.
Fourteen states include nondisclosure and/or lack of consent as an element of the
crime and, thus, require the prosecutor to prove these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt. 16 Eight states afford the charged individual the opportunity to
11

James B. McArthur, As the Tide Turns: The Changing HIV/AIDS Epidemic and the
Criminalization of HIV Exposure, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 707, 713 (2009).
12
Id. at 713–15.
13
Id. at 715 (“[S]tates [must] prove the adequacy of their laws for criminal
prosecution of intentional transmission of HIV before they could receive federal funding
for HIV/AIDS prevention.”).
14
Id.
15
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 120290–91 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24(2) (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-5-60(c) (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-608 (2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1216.2 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-41-7-1 (LexisNexis 2011), 35-42-1-9
(LexisNexis 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.1 (West 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:43.5 (2007); MD. CODE. ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-601.1 (LexisNexis 2009); MICH.
COMP. LAWS SERV. § 333.5210 (LexisNexis 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-27-14(1) (Supp.
2013); MO. ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (West 2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.205
(LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-5(b) (West Supp. 2013); 10A N.C. ADMIN.
CODE 41A.0202 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2903.11(B) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (West 2002);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-31 (2006); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-109 (Supp. 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.4:1 (2009); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.36.011 (West 2009); see also Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1518 n.2.
16
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(b) (2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 120291 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24(2) (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN § 16-5-

680

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

bring forth evidence of disclosure and consent as an affirmative defense.17 In these
states, the prosecutor must prove only that the infected person knew he or she was
infected with HIV and intentionally engaged in sexual relations with another. The
burden is then placed on the defendant to prove the elements set forth in the
statute’s affirmative defense provision. These elements vary among the states, but
most require the defendant to prove the exposed partner knew the defendant was
infected with the HIV, knew the conduct could result in exposure to the HIV, and
consented to engage in the conduct with that knowledge. 18 Two states’ criminal
statutes do not mention consent or disclosure and may leave HIV-positive persons
criminally liable for fully consensual acts. 19 The possibility that a nonculpable
individual will face criminal liability under an HIV-transmission statute is
particularly threatening for HIV-positive persons who participate in online dating.
C. Online Dating—Bringing People Together
Each year, millions of people log on to Internet dating sites looking for love
or sex. 20 The percentage of households with access to the Internet is projected to
rise, which will continue to expand the consumer market for online dating
services. 21 These sites allow members to customize “profiles by answering
questionnaires, as well as posting pictures, videos, and additional com-

60(c) (2011); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-41-7-1 (LexisNexis 2011), 35-42-1-9 (LexisNexis
2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 333.5210
(LexisNexis 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-5(b)
(West Supp. 2013); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 41A.0202 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2903.11(B) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (West 2002);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.4:1 (2009).
17
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-608(3) (2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2(d)
(West 2002); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.1(5) (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-27-14(1)
(Supp. 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 201.205(2) (LexisNexis 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-20-17(3) (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-33 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 3913-109(c) (Supp. 2013).
18
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2(d) (West 2002); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 709C.1(5) (West 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 201.205(2) (LexisNexis 2012); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-33 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-109(c) (2010). The model
statute offered in section III.C shifts the burden to the government to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was culpable with respect to his partner’s consent. This
structure appropriately shifts the burden onto the prosecution to prove every material
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
19
MD. CODE. ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-601.1 (LexisNexis 2009); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.36.011 (West 2009).
20
See Eli J. Finkel et al., Online Dating: A Critical Analysis From the Perspective of
Psychological Science, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 3, 4 (2012).
21
Dating Services in the US Industry Market Research Report Now Available from
IBISWorld, PRWEB, (Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/9/prweb9882157
.htm.
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ments . . . .” 22 While online dating sites enable people to connect beyond
traditional geographical and sociological constraints, there is often an
accompanying deficit of information as well. 23
From MillionaireMatch.com to SeniorPeopleMeet.com, niche-dating sites are
expected to see the greatest growth in coming years. 24 Among them are sites
targeting people with sexually transmitted diseases. 25 These sites cater to infected
individuals who specifically want to date other infected individuals. 26 For various
reasons, people with HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases often prefer these
sites. One woman described the dilemmas she encountered when revealing her
sexually transmitted disease to prospective mates: “It’s confusing, because you
don’t know when the right time is to tell somebody. Should you be up front and get
it over with or wait until the person develops feelings for you? It’s a big ethical
problem.” 27 She also explained that when she did reveal this information, the man
she was dating would often break it off. 28
While some individuals, like the woman above, use niche-dating sites as a
way to be upfront about identity, others do just the opposite. As one scholar notes:
The online environment permits us to foster a feeling of intimacy,
sharing, and connection without the real-time barriers and filters of
judgments based on physical appearance, race, occupation, class, and
age. This freedom is potentially liberating in that we can transcend social
expectations, identity, and typical scripts for our gender, class, and roles,
and experiment with alternate models of relating. 29
For these people, Internet dating provides an identity apart from that of an HIVpositive person. Other HIV-positive individuals prefer to reveal or reference their
serostatus via online dating profiles to avoid the discomfort involved with
communicating this information to partners face-to-face. 30
22

Trenton E. Gray, Internet Dating Websites: A Refuge for Internet Fraud, 12 FLA.
COASTAL L. REV. 389, 392 (2011).
23
Mary D. Fan, Sex, Privacy, and Public Health in a Casual Encounters Culture, 45
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 543, 553 (2011).
24
PRWEB, supra note 21.
25
See, e.g., POSITIVESINGLES, http://www.positivesingles.com (last visited Mar. 19,
2014) (serving individuals infected with herpes, HPV, HIV and other STDs).
26
Id.
27
Elizabeth Cohen, Rising STD Rate Sparks Online Dating Sites, CNN (Mar. 12,
2007, 1:36 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2007-02-27/health/std.internet_1_herpes-web-sites
human-papillomavirus?_s=PM:HEALTH.
28
Id.
29
Fan, supra note 23, at 543.
30
One HIV-positive interviewee in a British study on homosexual men and Internet
dating described, “I still just find it very embarrassing . . . . It’s one of those things. It’s not
great leading to sex.” Mark Davis et al., E-dating, Identity and HIV Prevention: Theorising
Sexualities, Risk and Network Society, 28 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 457, 470 (2006).
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Internet dating sites not only serve as a meeting ground for relationshipseekers, but also a platform where individuals pursue casual sex. The capacity of
the Internet to serve as a meeting ground for sexual encounters is so great that
some psychologists describe it as the “new sexual revolution.” 31
Adult dating sites facilitate casual sexual encounters among subscribers. 32
Like the more traditional online dating sites, there is a wide range of niche adult
dating sites that serve the HIV-positive population. 33 As these sites continue to
grow in popularity, people increasingly pursue casual sex with partners met
online. 34 Without traditional contextual sources to inform decision making, adult edaters must rely primarily on other users’ online profiles, which may or may not
contain accurate information. 35
III. ANALYSIS
HIV-transmission statutes targeting consensual sexual behaviors fail to draw a
clear line between sex with disclosure and/or consent and sex without disclosure
and/or consent. As a result of these ambiguities, situations may arise where the law
extends into the bedroom, criminalizing consensual, private sexual activity. These
issues are discussed in turn.
A. Disclosure and Consent
In the context of sexual relations, the law of disclosure and consent is far from
clear. The difficulties in ascertaining disclosure and consent arise from the
nonverbal ways people “negotiate[]” sex. 36 Direction as to what constitutes legally
acceptable disclosure and consent has not been provided by statute or
jurisprudence. 37 Is verbal disclosure and consent mandated? May disclosure and
31

See, e.g., Al Cooper & Eric Griffin-Shelley, Introduction: The Internet: The Next
Sexual Revolution, in SEX & THE INTERNET: A GUIDEBOOK FOR CLINICIANS 1, 2 (Al
Cooper ed., 2002).
32
See, e.g., ADULTFRIENDFINDER, http://adultfriendfinder.com (last visited Mar. 13,
2014).
33
HIVAdultDating.com explains to users “[n]ow it is safe to conduct yourself openly
without fear of judgment, here you will feel that peaceful feeling of acceptance. Allow
yourself the opportunity to date freely and free of stress, allow yourself to feel relaxed and
relieved with the other HIV positive singles from all around the world.” HIVADULT
DATING, http://www.hivadultdating.com/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
34
Fan, supra note 23, at 544.
35
Id.
36
Burris et al., supra note 7, at 469.
37
The ambiguous consent and disclosure provisions prevent HIV-positive individuals
from structuring their actions accordingly and may frustrate the purposes of the statute.
One study found that “[HIV-positive] people’s misunderstanding [of consent and
disclosure] could lead them to think wrongly that their actions (and inactions) are not
prohibited by law.” Catherine Dodds et al., Responses to Criminal Prosecutions for HIV
Transmission Among Gay Men with HIV in England and Wales, 17 REPROD. HEALTH
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consent be inferred from the circumstances? Does indicating one’s serostatus via
an Internet dating profile constitute disclosure? The answers to these questions are
uncertain. One scholar noted, “choosing to run the risk [of HIV exposure] with
‘informed consent’—disclosure—is morally different from being involuntarily
exposed, but in real life disclosure and consent may look more like an avian
mating ritual than the negotiation of a business contract . . . .” 38 The discussion
below seeks to highlight the manifest difficulties in legally ascertaining disclosure
and consent in the sexual context.
1. Consent to Exposure
Consent has the power to be morally and legally transformative. 39 This is
particularly true when lack of consent is an element of the crime itself. 40 While
consent is difficult to ascertain in the rape context, added difficulties arise in the
HIV-exposure context. When determining whether sex was consensual in the rape
context, the relevant inquiry is whether the partner consented to the act itself.
Whether there is indicia of physical resistance, incapacity, or signs of emotional
oppression, signals of nonconsent to an act are more outwardly apparent. 41
Professor David Archard writes that consent to sexual relations “is an act rather
than a state of mind.” 42 However, in the HIV-exposure context, consent to a risk is
a subjective state of mind. Absent verbal discourse, indicators of consent or
nonconsent to a risk are not easily ascertainable. That is, lack of consent to a risk is
not revealed through obvious behavioral and physical signals that would place an
HIV-positive person on notice that his or her partner does not consent to the risk of
HIV exposure. Moreover, a blanket assumption that no partner would consent to
the risk of HIV exposure may be inconsistent with an HIV-positive individual’s
past experiences and understanding about certain sexual behaviors. Indeed, there
are many complicated reasons why individuals, including HIV-negative persons,
may choose to assume certain health risks—particularly in the context of sexual

MATTERS 135, 143 (2009). Indeed “[b]y legitimating risk-taking via consent and
disclosure . . . the law affirms the need to disclose and to gain consent. The problem is that
in the absence of a clear understanding of what this means . . . some diagnosed people will
place themselves at risk of prosecution.” Id.
38
Burris et al., supra note 7, at 509.
39
Alan Wertheimer, What Is Consent? And Is It Important?, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
557, 559 (2000).
40
Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1546.
41
See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno et al., Panel Discussion, Men, Women and Rape, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 171 (1994) (“There are occasionally cases that happen that way,
but most of the time the signals that the victim has given, whether verbally or physically,
are very clear. There is very little rape that is due to failure to communicate . . . .” (quoting
Linda Fairstein, Chief, Sex Crimes Prosecution Unit and Deputy Chief, N.Y. County
District Attorney’s Office)).
42
DAVID ARCHARD, SEXUAL CONSENT 4 (1998); Wertheimer, supra note 39, at 567
n.16.
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relations and HIV. 43 As a result, it is more likely that an HIV-positive person may
honestly believe his or her partner consented.
Without explicit verbal dialogue, 44 HIV-positive people look to their
surroundings to determine whether their partner consented to the risk of HIV
exposure. 45 Because consent to the risk of HIV is subjective in nature, the HIVpositive individual must make certain assumptions about his or her partner’s
consent based on the circumstances. 46
Does seeking sex in a bath house equal consent to HIV exposure? . . . If
you don’t ask, does that mean I don’t have to tell? People may rely on
contextual signals, assuming that a partner in a public sex venue who
does not insist on safer sex has assumed the risk, or consented to the
possibility of infection by engaging in risky behavior without inquiring
about a partner’s HIV serostatus. 47
As set forth above, there is a range of circumstances that may give rise to
assumptions about partner consent. But when are these assumptions valid at law?
And what degree of culpability, if any, should the law attach to these assumptions?
The current state of the law on consent in the HIV-exposure context fails to
provide answers to these questions. Moreover, HIV-transmission statutes do not
account for circumstances where an individual honestly believed his partner
consented to the risk of HIV exposure. 48 And mistaken beliefs are relevant to an

43

See infra Part III.B.4 (discussing reasons why HIV-negative individuals may accept
the risk of HIV exposure); see also Fadhila Mazanderani, An Ethics of Intimacy: Online
Dating, Viral-Sociality and Living with HIV, 7 BIOSOCIETIES 393, 400 (2012) (noting the
“complexity of managing risk in the context of intimate relations and HIV,” and how
“[i]ntimacy and risk management do not, it seems, blend well together”).
44
Studies suggest that in some communities, nonverbal negotiation of consent and
disclosure is the norm. See ADAM BOURNE ET AL., RELATIVE SAFETY II: RISK AND
UNPROTECTED ANAL INTERCOURSE AMONG GAY MEN WITH DIAGNOSED HIV 19 (2009),
available at http://www.sigmaresearch.org.uk/files/report2009d.pdf (“There were those
who were much more direct about disclosing their own HIV status to all partners, as well
as always eliciting information about partners’ knowledge of their own status. However,
they constitute a minority of those taking part in this research.”); Dodds et al., supra note
37, at 142 (“Analysis within and across interview transcripts revealed that few men
disclosed their status in a clear and explicit manner. . . . [M]any respondents made what
they felt to be a disclosure of their status, but which had the potential to be misunderstood
by sexual partners.”).
45
See Dodds et al., supra note 37, at 142.
46
See id.
47
Burris et al., supra note 7, at 480.
48
See Erin E. Langley & Dominic J. Nardi, Jr., The Irony of Outlawing AIDS: A
Human Rights Argument Against the Criminalization of HIV Transmission, 11 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 743, 778 (2010).
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individual’s moral blameworthiness. 49 Considering the purely subjective nature of
consenting to a risk and the good-faith mistakes that may follow, the statutes
should account for a defendant’s degree of culpability vis-à-vis partner consent. 50
Grading offenses based on knowledge, 51 recklessness, 52 and negligence 53 would
better ensure that a defendant will not become subject to disproportionate
punishment. 54
2. Disclosure of Serostatus
Like consent, the measures an individual must take to “disclose” his or her
serostatus are unclear under state statutes. 55 While case law is limited in this area,
one Ohio court found that verbal disclosure sufficiently reveals one’s positive HIV
status; that written, signed, and notarized disclosure is unnecessary; and that after
initial disclosure, an individual would not be guilty for any subsequent sexual
encounters with that same partner. 56 While verbal disclosure may be sufficient,
courts have yet to describe it as mandatory. It remains uncertain whether disclosure
can be inferred from circumstances.
49

See Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1545 (“[L]egislatures that determine that reckless
conduct should be criminally liable should require the prosecutor to demonstrate that the
defendant ignored a substantial and unjustifiable risk of transmission.”).
50
The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) recommends
against the use of criminal law in circumstances where the person “honestly and reasonably
believed the other person was aware of his or her status through some other means.”
UNAIDS, ENDING OVERLY BROAD CRIMINALISATION OF HIV NON-DISCLOSURE,
EXPOSURE AND TRANSMISSION: CRITICAL SCIENTIFIC, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL
CONSIDERATIONS 26 (2013) [hereinafter UNAIDS GUIDANCE NOTE].
51
“A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when . . .
he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist” or if “he is
aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.” MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02 (2)(b) (1985).
52
“A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists
or will result from his conduct.” Id. § 2.02 (2)(c).
53
“A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he
should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or
will result from his conduct.” Id. § 2.02 (2)(d).
54
See infra Part III.C.1.
55
See, e.g., Taylor Craig Newbold, Full Disclosure: Idaho’s HIV Disclosure Laws
Causing Their Own Issues, BOISEWEEKLY (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.boiseweekly.com/b
oise/full-disclosure-idahos-hiv-disclosure-laws-causing-their-own-issues/Content?oid=280
3038 (noting how Idaho’s “statute does not stipulate what exactly constitutes disclosure”).
56
See State v. Gonzalez, 796 N.E.2d 12, 22 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (“A person of
common intelligence would understand that verbal disclosure effectively and sufficiently
reveals the information. A person of common intelligence would also understand that once
the person being told hears and comprehends the information, the person is not likely to
forget such a significant revelation, and does not need to be told each time before further
intimacies.”).
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The contextual circumstances that contribute to the mistaken assumption of
partner consent will likely be the same circumstances that lead to the determination
that disclosure is not necessary. HIV-positive individuals may employ “a range of
proxy behaviours which they believe[] to be a simulation of disclosure, and . . .
[will] generate a fair idea of their partners’ status.” 57 For example, the “Code of the
Condom” holds that “[t]he person who assiduously uses condoms has no
obligation . . . [to] inform his prospective sexual partners of his HIV status, even
when he knows himself to be infected.” 58 In this scenario, the HIV-positive
individual’s assumption that his partner is familiar with the “Code of the
Condom”—a community norm—may enlighten his decision that disclosure is
unnecessary. The “Code of the Condom” raises another important consideration
discussed in detail below; assumptions about community norms influence
disclosure. Indeed, individuals living with HIV “live and work in a complicated
array of circumstances,” and whether the influence of community norms or fear of
personal harm, disclosure may not always be the most appropriate response. 59
Lastly, transmission laws containing disclosure provisions alone fail to
adequately protect others. 60 Disclosure alone does not ensure that a partner had the
information necessary to make an educated choice concerning his or her own
health. Unlike consent, disclosure can occur without a partner’s awareness of the

57

BOURNE ET AL., supra note 44, at 19.
Lazzarini et al., supra note 2, at 249 (quoting David L. Chambers, Gay Men, AIDS,
and the Code of the Condom, 29 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 353 (1994)). Condom use
does not absolve an HIV-positive person from criminal liability in most states. See, e.g.,
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-608 (2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 191.677(4) (West 2011); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-109 (Supp. 2013). California, however, provides an exception for
condom use. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291 (West 2012).
59
Aziza Ahmed & Beri Hull, Sex and HIV Disclosure, 38 HUM. RTS. 11, 13 (2011).
Scholars have noted that in certain situations, nondisclosure may be the product of power
imbalances between partners and fear of physical harm. See Kane Race, Framing
Responsibility: HIV, Biomedical Prevention, and the Performativity of the Law, 9 J.
BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 327, 331 n.3 (2012) (“The very idea of disclosure assumes that sex
takes place face-to-face between partners of equal power and with some impetus to speak.”
(quoting Heather Worth et al., Reckless Vectors: The Infecting “Other” in HIV/AIDS Law,
2 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y 3, 10 (2005)); Leslie E. Wolf & Richard Vezina, Crime
and Punishment: Is There A Role for Criminal Law in HIV Prevention Policy?, 25
WHITTIER L. REV. 821, 874 (2004) (“Reasons for non-disclosure are complex. In some
cases, people need to learn skills to help them disclose, something that some public health
prevention programs address. In other cases, disclosure may place people at risk of other
harm.” (citation omitted)).
60
Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1534–35; see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11(B)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (“No person, with knowledge that the person has tested positive
as a carrier of a virus that causes [AIDS], shall knowingly . . . [e]ngage in sexual conduct
with another person without disclosing that knowledge to the other person prior to
engaging in the sexual conduct . . . .”).
58
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corresponding risks of HIV exposure. 61 For example, the exposed partner may be
intoxicated such that he or she could not appreciate the risks involved. Awareness,
on the other hand, can occur without disclosure. 62 As discussed above, risk
awareness can be derived from circumstances alone. “While disclosure is evidence
of awareness of risk, the two are not coextensive.”63 Thus, if criminal-transmission
statutes are to protect those powerless to protect themselves from the health risks
associated with HIV exposure, disclosure language must be discarded.
3. Burdening Privacy Rights
As implied in the previous subsection, neither legislatures nor courts have
defined whether verbal consent and disclosure is mandatory. The Internet
introduces a platform where serostatus can be communicated nonverbally and
consent can be negotiated based on the circumstances. For example, one’s
presence on an HIV-specific dating site discloses serostatus and contextually
communicates consent to exposure. 64 Where it is unclear whether the exposure
statutes impose a mandatory verbal disclosure and consent rule, criminal laws may
reach private, consensual sexual conduct.
As discussed in detail below, there are many complicated reasons why HIVnegative individuals may wish to expose themselves to the virus,65 and the right to
privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment may protect an individual’s interest to
do so. 66 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the privacy right includes an
“interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.” 67 After
first identifying the unenumerated substantive-due-process right of privacy in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 68 the Supreme Court has spent nearly four decades
determining its reach. 69 Lawrence v. Texas 70 served as a “powerful affirmation of a

61

See Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1534–35 (discussing various reasons disclosure of HIV
status may not by itself reduce the risk of HIV transmission).
62
Id. (without disclosure “an individual may know her partner’s serostatus . . . or may
be unsure of a partner’s serostatus but be aware of the risk of transmission.”). But see R. v.
Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371, 372 (Can.) (“Without disclosure of HIV status there cannot
be a true consent.”).
63
See Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1534.
64
See discussion infra Part III.B.4.
65
See infra text accompanying notes 120–123.
66
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–54 (1973) (“[T]he right [to privacy] has some
extension to activities relating to . . . contraception . . . .”).
67
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977) (citations omitted).
68
381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965).
69
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S 558, 567 (2003) (finding that the right to
privacy encompasses the rights of adults to engage in private, consensual sexual conduct);
Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (finding the “right of personal privacy includes the abortion
decision”).
70
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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right to privacy.” 71 Lawrence recognized that the right to privacy extended to
private, consensual sexual relations. 72 Although the Court neither described this
right as fundamental nor articulate a level of scrutiny, scholars suggest that laws
infringing upon this right must meet some form of heightened scrutiny. 73
Assuming laws concerning the right to private, consensual sexual activity are
subject to heightened scrutiny, it follows that “[t]he means chosen must be more
than a reasonable way of attaining” the state’s policy objective. 74 Whether laws
implicating this right are subject to some form of intermediate or strict scrutiny,
such laws must be “narrowly tailored” to achieve the state’s goals. 75
In light of the reasoning above, the ambiguities surrounding the consent and
disclosure provisions in the HIV-exposure statutes may offend constitutional
principles. Because the right to consensual sexual activity is protected, thus
demanding some form of heightened scrutiny, HIV-exposure laws need to be
narrowly tailored such that only culpable behavior is punished. Online dating sites
make nonverbal disclosure and consent possible. With no guiding standards as to
whether nonverbal consent and disclosure is legally permissible, prosecutors may
bring charges against HIV-positive individuals for engaging in private, consensual
sexual activity—constitutionally protected behavior. Given the stigma that already
accompanies HIV, 76 the chances are greater that wholly nonculpable behavior will
become subject to selective, morality-based prosecutions. 77

71

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 868 (4th
ed. 2011).
72
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
73
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky highlights two reasons why laws implicating the right to
private, consensual sexual activity may be subject to heightened scrutiny. First, the
Lawrence court relied on past privacy cases where strict scrutiny was applied. Second, the
State of Texas’s proffered justification for its deviate sexual intercourse law—advancing
moral interests—would traditionally satisfy rational basis review. However, the law was
invalidated in this case. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, at 868.
74
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, at 553.
75
See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 569−70 (2001) (holding
that some regulations reviewed under intermediate scrutiny do not need to be the least
restrictive alternative, but must be narrowly tailored and substantially related to the state’s
goals); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279−80 (1986) (explaining that
strict scrutiny analysis mandates that laws be narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling
state purpose).
76
Jane K. Stoever, Stories Absent from the Courtroom: Responding to Domestic
Violence in the Context of HIV and AIDS, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1157, 1185−86 (2009)
(explaining how discrimination against people living with HIV is “rampant”); see also
Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1536 (“Criminalizing sexual activity regardless of the actual risk it
poses uses criminal law’s expressive purpose of condemnation to endorse this stigma.”).
77
Cf. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, at 970 (explaining how vague laws restricting
speech can create a risk of selective prosecution because under vague laws “the
government can choose who[m] to prosecute based on their views or politics” without clear
notice of what conduct is prohibited).
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B. Consent, Disclosure, and Online Dating
The consent and disclosure provisions in HIV-transmission statutes disregard
the complexities involved in negotiating sex. The Internet adds a new layer of
complication. 78 As discussed in Part II.C, the Internet has become an important
venue for people to meet sexual and romantic partners, 79 and many HIV-positive
individuals enjoy the conveniences of online disclosure. Given the Internet’s
popularity as a means to seek partners and the conveniences of online disclosure, it
is logical to assume that the Internet would encourage candor and facilitate the
effective negotiation of consent and disclosure. However, the Internet forum
actually may frustrate these purposes.
One study noted how concern among HIV-positive individuals about “the
lack of control they now exercised over . . . personal information meant they were
now rarely open about their HIV status among friends and acquaintances.” 80 These
individuals were reluctant to be candid about their HIV status and safer sex
practices on social sexual networking sites. 81
Moreover, design features of online dating profiles restructure sexual
negotiation, giving rise to new assumptions about a partner’s HIV status and
normalizing ambiguous disclosure practices. 82 For example, one study observed
how routine prompting of HIV status on profiles may alter the practices and
expectations of those navigating the online dating context. 83 “Where previously,
HIV-negative men were encouraged to presume all their sexual partners were
potentially HIV-positive and modify their sexual practice accordingly, increasingly
they are much more likely to presume their partners are HIV-negative unless
circumstances (such as reluctance to disclose HIV status) indicate otherwise.” 84
While in some cases, the Internet may break down initial barriers to HIV
disclosure and encourage frank discussions about HIV status and partner consent,
the Internet itself is often the barrier to these frank discussions. In the online dating
78

Nicolas Sheon & G. Michael Crosby, Ambivalent Tales of HIV Disclosure in San
Francisco, 58 SOC. SCI. & MED. 2105, 2116 (2004) (noting that the Internet has
“dramatically affected the calculus of risk and norms of disclosure”).
79
Mary D. Fan, Decentralizing STD Surveillance: Toward Better Informed Sexual
Consent, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 18–22 (2012). It is worth noting that
numerous HIV-positive individuals already have been prosecuted for exposing partners
they met online to the virus. See, e.g., Boise Man Charged with Transferring HIV, IDAHO
PRESS TRIB. (Sept. 14, 2010, 12:59 PM), http://www.idahopress.com/news/article_bbfc76a
c-c032-11df-9d38-001cc4c002e0.html; Man Given 25 Years for Not Disclosing HIV,
QCONLINE, (May 02, 2009, 11:11 PM), http://qconline.com/archives/qco/display.php?id=4
37798; Patricia M. Murret, Man Accused of Exposing Woman to HIV, GAZETTE.NET, (Apr.
29, 2009), http://ww2.gazette.net/stories/04292009/gaitnew205325_32520.shtml.
80
Dodds et al., supra note 37, at 141.
81
Id.
82
See Kane Race, Click Here for HIV Status: Shifting Templates of Sexual
Negotiation, 3 EMOTION, SPACE & SOC’Y 7, 8–11 (2010).
83
Id. at 13.
84
Id.
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environment, context may speak loudly and effectively. When it does, users glean
the same information from the context (i.e., an individual’s HIV-positive status)
and share a common understanding based on this information. 85 However, in some
instances, context does not speak as effectively as one may assume. In these
instances, good-faith mistakes are likely to occur—mistakes about a partner’s
consent to HIV exposure among them. 86
This Note proposes four scenarios where the various problems surrounding
disclosure and consent may manifest in the context of online dating. Although
these scenarios are hypothetical, they are informed by findings from studies and
interviews with HIV-positive and -negative e-daters. The first three scenarios serve
to show how various assumptions about online dating community norms may lead
to mistakes regarding partner consent. The fourth scenario provides a situation
where criminal liability may attach to constitutionally protected private, consensual
sexual conduct.
1. Serostatus Displayed on an Online Dating Profile
In this scenario, the HIV-positive e-dater—let’s call him Bob—posts his
serostatus prominently on his profile. Angela, an HIV-negative e-dater does not
notice the serostatus and later engages in sexual intercourse with Bob. In this
scenario, Bob believes verbal disclosure is unnecessary because he indicated his
serostatus on his online profile. 87 He assumes, in good faith, his partner knew he
was HIV positive.
Bob’s assumption that Angela consented to exposure was further informed by
one online dating community norm called “serosorting.” Serosorting is an HIVprevention practice 88 where individuals select romantic or sexual partners based on
those that share an identical serostatus. 89 Potential partners may rely on Internet
profiles for serosorting. 90 Based on Bob’s understanding that serosorting is
85

See infra Part III.B.4.
See infra Parts III.C.1–3.
87
According to one study, “[n]arratives that described Internet cruising suggested that
personal profiles eliminate the need to discuss status in person, or even online.” Sheon &
Crosby, supra note 78, at 2112.
88
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention explicitly states that it does not
recommend serosorting as a safer sex practice. It cautions, “[s]erosorting is not
recommended because: (1) too many MSM [men seeking men] who have HIV do not know
they are infected because they have not been tested for HIV recently, (2) men’s
assumptions about the HIV status of their partners may be wrong, and (3) some HIVpositive men may not tell or may misrepresent their HIV status.” Serosorting Among Gay,
Bisexual and Other Men Who Have Sex with Men, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/msmhealth/Serosorting.htm (last updated Oct. 24, 2011).
89
Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1563.
90
DANIEL E. SICONOLFI & ROBERT W. MOELLER, SEROSORTING, 19 BETA 45, 45
(2007), available at http://img.thebody.com/sfaf/pdfs/winter07_serosorting.pdf. One study
“found that the [I]nternet was generally regarded by HIV-positive men as a safer space in
which they could signal their HIV status to other positive men.” Race, supra note 82, at 11.
86

2014]

CRIMINALIZING THE TRANSMISSION OF HIV

691

common practice within HIV online dating circles, he assumes there is a high
probability that Angela engages in the practice of serosorting. 91 In other words,
Bob believed Angela was HIV positive as well. Under these good-faith
assumptions, Bob does not disclose his status. Indeed, studies have confirmed that
perceptions about a partner’s HIV status often influence an individual’s decision to
disclose. 92 As demonstrated in this scenario, assumptions based on e-dating norms
and the ability of the Internet to communicate serostatus propagate mistaken
beliefs about consent and disclosure.
2. Code-Word Disclosure
In this scenario, Ralph, a homosexual HIV-positive e-dater, relies on cultural
code words to communicate his serostatutus via his online dating profile. The
responding partner, Stuart, is HIV negative and does not understand the cue word
Ralph used. Without knowing Ralph was HIV-positive, Stuart engages in sexual
intercourse with Ralph after responding to Ralph’s Internet dating profile.
The use of code language largely results from e-daters’ desires to present
themselves in a favorable light or to avoid the unsexy conversation accompanying
dialogue about HIV. As one scholar noted, “because of the self-advertising
imperative in the online marketplace for sex and romance, ads and representations
may be deliberately opaque, euphemistic, ambiguous, and suggestive.” 93 For
example, one study found that some e-daters disposed of the box indicating their
HIV serostatus on Gay.com (an online dating site). 94 Instead they specified that
they practiced safe sex “sometimes,” instead of “always.” 95 In a sexier manner,
these modifications served as a discrete code suggesting they were HIV-positive. 96
An interviewee in the study expressed this sentiment:
I don’t disclose. I still just find it very embarrassing I don’t mind telling
you. It’s one of those things. It’s not great leading to sex. It’s like putting
the goddamned condom on in the first place. There is nothing sexy about
discussing you’re HIV positive prior to doing the deed . . . if you put
‘sometimes’ or ‘never’ for safe sex on your profile, everyone assumes. 97

91

See Dodds et al., supra note 37, at 142 (“Just as disclosure was sometimes
ambiguous, so were the practices that some men described as ‘ensuring’ they knew whether
their sexual partners also had HIV. Actually, gaining unequivocal understanding of sexual
partners’ HIV infection was rare.”).
92
Robert Klitzman et al., It’s Not Just What You Say: Relationships of HIV
Disclosure and Risk Reduction Among MSM in the Post-HAART Era, 19 AIDS CARE:
PSYCHOL. SOCIO-MED. ASPECTS AIDS/HIV 749, 749–51 (2007).
93
Fan, supra note 79, at 27–28.
94
Davis et al., supra note 30, at 468–70, 472.
95
Id. at 469–70.
96
Fan, supra note 79, at 28.
97
Davis et al., supra note 30, at 470.
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Suggesting serostatus by expressing desire for unprotected sex may be a painless
and sexy way for this interviewee to disclose his status. 98
Others may use explicit images of unsafe sex to communicate serostatus.
Consider the following conversation between an interviewer and interviewee:
MD:

So how do you present yourself on the website? Do you
say you are positive?
Interviewee: I used to do and I deleted that part of my profile. If people
ask me the question I will always tell the truth. If you look
at my site, my name and the fact that I say I never practise
safe sex and just look at the pictures that I have got posted
there. Quite frankly if you have to ask the question then
you’re being pretty damn naïve . . . . 99
Turning back to our fictional characters, Ralph, in good faith, assumed Stuart
understood that practicing safe sex “sometimes” constituted disclosure of his
serostatus. In other words, he engaged in a “proxy behaviour[] . . . believed to be a
simulation of disclosure.” 100 Ralph’s assumptions about Stuart’s understanding of
online community code and norms informed his decision that disclosure was
unnecessary.
Ralph’s experience is parallel to that of one e-dater who was a respondent in a
British study that explored instances of unprotected sex among homosexual men
diagnosed with HIV. 101 This man recounted an incident where he initially assumed
his partner was aware of his HIV-positive status. 102 Sensing his partner was not
aware of his serostatus, however, the man mentioned he was “poz”; his partner
then responded, “[w]hat does poz mean?” 103 The man characterized this experience
as a “learning point” where he realized that “even though [a serostatus reference] is
down on my profile[,] . . . I have to get back to how it used to be where I don’t
make that assumption . . . .” 104 His experience highlights how online dating more
readily fosters mistaken assumptions about partner consent—assumptions that he
would not have made in more traditional social settings.
Ralph and the British interviewee communicated serostatus using language
they understood to be common parlance in the online dating community.
Nevertheless, their partners were unfamiliar with this vocabulary. The examples in
98

Id.
Id. at 468.
100
BOURNE ET AL., supra note 44, at 19 (characterizing one’s “ticking ‘safer sex to be
discussed’ on an online profile” as one of these “proxy behaviors”). Id. Similar to Ralph’s
assumption, the Relative Safety II researchers found that “[a] large number of respondents
who used [online dating sites] indicated that safe sex ‘needs discussion’ on their user
profile, believing this to be a clear indicator of their HIV infection.” Id. at 26.
101
Id. at 26.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
99
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this section serve to reemphasize how assumptions about online community norms
may lead to good-faith mistakes regarding partner disclosure and consent.
3. The Adult Dating Site
This scenario concerns Lola and Jack, two individuals who meet on an adult
dating site. Lola is HIV positive, and Jack is HIV negative. Without discussing
serostatus, the two engage in casual, unprotected sex. Given the risks that arise
from engaging in casual, unprotected sex with partners met over the Internet—
among them, the risk of contracting HIV—Lola assumed that Jack consented to the
risk of exposure.
Assumptions about the behaviors of online sex seekers inform the HIVpositive individual’s determination of whether disclosure is necessary. 105 The risk
of HIV infection is heightened when “[o]nline sex-seekers are more apt to engage
in riskier behaviors, such as casual sex and concurrent partnerships.” 106 The
Internet also enables “targeted shopping among searchable personals for someone
amenable to riskier modes of sex, such as ‘barebacking’—the practice of anal or
vaginal sex without a condom.” 107 Lola’s assumption that Jack was receptive to
sexual risk-taking with concurrent partners led her to the conclusion that he
consented to the risk of exposure.
Additionally, Lola’s experience with past partners, who all took measures to
mitigate the risk of exposure, led her to believe that Jack consented because he did
not inquire about her status. Studies show that people acknowledge the risks
involved with engaging in casual sex with partners met over the Internet. Around
64% of people ages eighteen to twenty-four have discussed their HIV status with
partners met online. 108 Meanwhile, approximately 75% of persons aged twentyfive and older inquired about HIV status with online partners. 109 An HIV-positive
person might believe that because past partners inquired about serostatus 110 or used

105

For some individuals, nondisclosure about being HIV-positive or HIV-negative is
accepted as a norm in the casual encounter context. For example, consider the comments of
this HIV-negative interviewee: “It must be so impossible to disclose, particularly in a
casual situation. I don’t think disclosure is a responsibility. It’s a bonus. I just think
everyone’s potentially HIV positive, that’s how I deal with it.” Race, supra note 82, at 11.
This man, along with other men interviewed in this study, adhere to the “traditional policy
of assuming any of their casual partners could be HIV-positive”—a policy “situated in
terms of the norms of non-disclosure that have operated historically in many casual sex
contexts.” Id.
106
Fan, supra note 23, at 554; see also Fan, supra note 79, at 27–28.
107
Fan, supra note 23, at 554.
108
Mary McFarlane et al., Young Adults on the Internet: Risk Behaviors for Sexually
Transmitted Diseases and HIV, 31 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 11, 14, tbl.2 (2002).
109
Id.
110
See Race, supra note 82, at 12 (interviewing one HIV-negative man who explained
that he “always asked” about his partner’s serostatus before having unprotected sex).
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a condom, 111 the partner who does not take these precautions consents to the risk
of exposure.
In the context of online sex-seeking, an HIV-positive person may believe
one’s partner has a greater responsibility to mitigate the risks of HIV exposure. 112
She assumes that the risks flowing from casual sex with Internet partners are
apparent. Furthermore, her experience with past partners, who all took precautions,
lend credence to the belief that sexual partners will always inquire about serostatus
if they are truly concerned. Under these assumptions, she feels her responsibility to
disclose is negated. Indeed, “[s]tudies of HIV-positive people who fail to disclose
their status to sexual partners indicate that one commonly proffered reason for not
disclosing was that individuals felt a lessened sense of responsibility or concern for
the sexual partner in the casual encounter context.” 113 The world of online sexseeking alters perceptions about rights, responsibilities, and disclosure. 114 As a
result, the Internet dating site, as a medium for casual sex-seeking, more readily
fosters mistaken assumptions about disclosure and consent.
4. Communications over an HIV-Specific Dating Site
Run a standard Google search using the key words “HIV” and “online
dating,” and dozens of dating sites targeting the HIV-positive population appear.
As discussed above, HIV-specific dating sites permit individuals to reveal their
positive status to prospective partners without the discomfort involved with faceto-face disclosure. 115 Some of the HIV dating sites even seek to attract potential
members by appealing to the fear of disclosure. 116 In this context, disclosure occurs
nonverbally in two ways. First, presence on the dating site itself may serve as a
means of disclosure, 117 and second, serostatus may be explicitly revealed on one’s
dating profile. Thus, membership on an HIV dating site, or serostatus disclosure
via profile, replaces verbal disclosure and may discourage frank discussions.

111

See id. at 11 (stating that a number of HIV-negative men found that “the use
of condoms tended to substitute for the need to know their partner’s HIV status”).
112
See Ahmed & Hull, supra note 59, at 12.
113
Fan, supra note 79, at 22; see also Dodds et al., supra note 37, at 141 (finding that
some HIV-positive individuals believed that anonymous, casual sexual settings carried a
lower risk of prosecution because they assumed that “people in such environments knew
and accepted the risks”).
114
See Ahmed & Hull, supra note 59, at 12.
115
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
116
See, e.g., HIVDATING, http://www.hiv-dating.org/ (“If you’re looking for love and
companionship without the fear of judgment and disclosure, you’ve come to the right
place!”) (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).
117
Profiles on certain HIV-specific dating sites may make no mention of serostatus at
all to avoid identification of oneself in terms of an illness. See Whitney Digilio & Kate
Klonick, Online Dating Helps People With AIDS, HIV, ABC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2006), http://abcnews.
go.com/Health/story?id=2690839&page=1#.UHcfchXA-Jp.
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For most individuals, HIV-positive dating sites serve as a forum where HIVpositive individuals go to forge a relationship. However, HIV-negative individuals
may be active on these sites as well. In February of 2003, an article appeared in
Rolling Stone Magazine identifying a practice called “bug chasing.” 118 The author
described “bug chasers” as HIV-negative gay men who actively seek infection
from HIV-positive individuals. 119 While this practice has been questioned as myth,
studies have shown the phenomenon does exist among a minority of gay men. 120 In
many ways, the subculture is driven by Internet dating forums; “[t]he Internet has
proven itself a powerful tool in linking individuals with similar, and in some cases,
marginalised interests.” 121
The bug-chasing subculture exemplifies the many complicated reasons why
individuals accept certain health risks. 122 So, why might a person want to contract
HIV? Researchers have suggested several themes. First, bug chasers may believe
that infection is inevitable and contracting HIV eliminates uncertainty and fosters a
sense of relief. 123 Meanwhile, others may view sex without condoms as erotic and
dangerous. 124 Researchers also suggest that bug chasers may pursue infection to
escape loneliness or may do so to gain a sense of empowerment by “preemptively
fulfilling . . . negative societal labels.” 125
Given the reasons why an HIV-negative person may seek exposure, this Note
proposes one last scenario. Lars is an HIV-positive homosexual male who is active
on an HIV-specific dating site. Fearing HIV infection is inevitable, Gus, who is
HIV negative, decides to take control and engage in sexual relations with Lars.
Lars believes verbal disclosure is not necessary because his presence on an HIVpositive dating site speaks for itself. He believes responding potential partners are
HIV positive or, possibly for one of the reasons discussed above, otherwise willing
118

Gregory A. Freeman, In Search of Death, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 6, 2003, at 44.
Id.
120
CHRISTIAN GROV & JEFFREY T. PARSONS, Bug Chasing and Gift Giving: The
Potential for HIV Transmission Among Barebackers on the Internet, 18 AIDS EDUC.
PREVENTION 490, 490–91 (2006) (This data suggests that “bug chasing and gift giving do
exist; however a sizable portion of both bug chasers and gift givers were not intent on
spreading HIV”). “Gift giving” refers to “HIV-positive men who seek to pass HIV to
seronegative men . . . .” Id.
121
Christian Grov, Barebacking Websites: Electronic Environments for Reducing or
Inducing HIV Risk, 18 AIDS CARE 990, 995 (2006). “The Internet, and specifically
websites devoted to barebacking, has also been connected to the emerging phenomena of
gift giving and bug chasing.” Id. at 991.
122
“Intimacy and risk management do not, it seems, blend well together, as has been
vividly illustrated in research on the subculture of ‘barebacking’ and the active pursuit of
HIV infection (‘bug chasing’) among gay men.” See Mazanderani, supra note 43, at 400.
123
Grov & Parsons, supra note 120, at 492; see also Richard Pendry, HIV ‘Bug
Chasers’: Fantasy or Fact?, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4895012.stm
(last updated Apr. 10, 2006, 10:22 PM) (describing one man’s feelings as “welcom[ing] the
‘inevitable’” as he learned of his diagnosis of being HIV positive).
124
GROV & PARSONS, supra note 120, at 492.
125
Id.
119
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to assume the risk of HIV exposure. Under these assumptions, Lars and Gus never
discuss one another’s serostatus and engage in private, consensual sexual relations.
As discussed in Part II.A.3, private, consensual sexual relations are a
protected privacy right under the Fourteenth Amendment. Supposing Gus presses
charges, and Lars is ultimately convicted under an HIV-exposure statute, Lars
would be convicted of a crime based on the exercise of his own constitutional
rights. For purposes of examination, this scenario is presented hypothetically in the
Internet dating context. However, there are reported cases where a consenting
partner ultimately decides to press charges, often for retaliatory purposes, against
an HIV-positive partner. 126 It is possible that this scenario has already played out in
real life as sexual relations risking HIV exposure generally occur in private and
beyond the purview of witnesses. 127 Thus, fact finders are generally presented with
“he said, she said” testimony at trial. 128
C. Suggested Remedies
Consent to sexual relations is expressed through action, whereas consent to a
risk is a state of mind. 129 Without uttering a word, nonconsent to an act can be
ascertained by physical indicators. However, in the absence of a verbal exchange,
it is difficult to determine nonconsent to the risk of HIV exposure. Invariably, an
HIV-positive person will be mistaken about his need to disclose based on
misunderstanding about his partner’s consent. Where courts have yet to impose a
mandate of verbal disclosure and consent, it is tempting to advocate for an
affirmative consent and disclosure requirement to rectify problems of mistake. A
verbal mandate would be the most effective way to prevent misunderstandings
concerning consent to HIV exposure. Aside from the practical considerations
surrounding the question of how this approach could be incorporated into our legal
system, 130 imposing a verbal-permission rule every time an HIV-positive
126

For example, in one reported Canadian case, a woman was charged with
aggravated sexual assault for not disclosing her HIV-positive status to her boyfriend when
they began dating five years earlier. At some point, they broke up, and the man was
charged with assault in response to complaints of domestic violence against the woman. In
retaliation, he asserted that she did not disclose her HIV-positive status before they
engaged in unprotected sexual relations, although the woman testified that they had used
condoms since their relationship commenced. “In a bitter irony, he was given an absolute
discharge with no criminal record despite being found guilty of assaulting her and her son.”
Alison Symington, Criminalization Confusion and Concerns: The Decade Since the
Cuerrier Decision, 14 HIV/AIDS POL’Y & L. REV. 4, 9 (2009); see also BOURNE ET AL.,
supra note 44, at 12 (finding that some HIV-positive individuals were fearful of
“retribution from disgruntled ex-partners”).
127
See Fan, supra note 23, at 574–75 (discussing the problems with proving consent
at trial).
128
Id. at 574.
129
See supra Part III.A.1.
130
Dan Subotnik, Copulemus in Pace: A Meditation on Rape, Affirmative Consent to
Sex, and Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 847, 857–59 (2008). It is worth noting that a
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individual engages in sexual intercourse “would impose an excessive degree of
formality and artificiality on a dimension of life in which spontaneity is
important.” 131
If consent is not negotiated verbally, then it will be negotiated based on
contextual cues and understandings about human behavior. However, these
indicators are imperfect sources of information. Thus, there is a strong probability,
especially when Internet dating is concerned, that an HIV-positive individual will
hold a mistaken, but good-faith, belief that his or her partner consented. As
demonstrated above, community norms exist within the HIV Internet dating
community. Consequently, there are outsiders unaware of these conventions, and
HIV-positive individuals may mistakenly rely on these norms to their detriment.
In their current form, the transmission statutes do not distinguish between
those who intend harm from those who hold a good-faith belief that a partner
consented. The statutes also fail to proportionately assign punishment to those who
were reckless or negligent with regard to their partner’s consent.132 Accordingly,
the possibility for disproportionate punishment results. 133 The laws need to be
restructured in a way that allocates punishment based on the degree of
blameworthiness inherent in the conduct itself. Professor Margo Kaplan recently
proposed a sample statute 134 that would afford punishment according to a
defendant’s degree of blameworthiness relative to her partner’s consent. Kaplan’s
sample statute reads as follows:

verbal mandate would not resolve issues relating to conflicting evidence—the “he-said,
she-said” problem—that may arise in criminal prosecutions under HIV-exposure statutes.
131
Wertheimer, supra note 39, at 574.
132
Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1532–34.
133
All states with HIV-exposure statutes categorize the offense as a felony with the
exception of Maryland and North Carolina. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN § 18-601.1(b)
(LexisNexis 2009); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 41A.0202 (2011).
134
Professor Kaplan proposes three changes to the transmission statutes. See
generally Kaplan, supra note 8. First, she suggests the statutes should punish in terms of
risk creation. This requires juries to consider all the factors that influence the risk to which
the defendant exposed the victim, such as viral load and condom use. Second, she proposes
that the prosecution demonstrate the defendant had a culpable mental state as to
transmission. Third, she suggests “a more nuanced approach to consent that focuses on
consent to degrees of risk.” Id. at 1522.
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It is unlawful for an individual
(1) [with the purpose of infecting another with HIV]
(2) [who is aware of and ignores a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that her actions will result in HIV infection of another]
(3) [who should have been aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that her actions will result in HIV infection of another]
to engage in conduct that creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
infecting another with HIV. For the purposes of this statute, the word
“creates” applies only to the degree of risk that the defendant
[knows/recklessly disregards a risk/should have known] the victim did
not consent to. 135
1. Defects Cured
Kaplan’s statute resolves several issues discussed in this Note. First, the
model statute assigns punishment in relation to the defendant’s degree of moral
blameworthiness. For example, an HIV-positive defendant who knows his or her
partner did not consent to HIV exposure may be distinguished from the defendant
who should have been aware his or her partner did not consent. The defendant
who, albeit negligently or recklessly, is mistaken about his partner’s consent may
be punished proportionately. 136 Statutory construction in this manner avoids the
risk of disproportionate punishment. Consider, for example, scenario one where
Bob posted his HIV-positive status on his online dating profile but failed to
verbally disclose his status to his partner. Here, the jury may choose to convict Bob
of a lesser offense based on a negligence standard—even though he believed in
good faith that his partner knew his serostatus, he should have been aware of the
substantial and unjustifiable risk that his partner did not consent to exposure.
Second, the statute removes all of the disclosure language. Disclosure alone
does not ensure that an exposed partner consciously appreciated the risks of
exposure. Punishment is centered on the defendant’s level of awareness in relation
to what his or her partner consented. Awareness of partner consent need not result
from verbal exchange alone, and Kaplan’s statute permits partners to negotiate
consent contextually. 137

135

Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1551.
Still, as noted by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, “because of
prejudices against people living with HIV—including those from marginalized and
stigmatized populations”—applying standards of recklessness and negligence could be
problematic because juries, courts, and prosecutors may find that “any sexual acts” by
HIV-positive people meet these standards of culpability. UNAIDS GUIDANCE NOTE, supra
note 50, at 23.
137
See Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1550–51 (discussing current statutes’ failure to
consider social cues as a form of consent).
136
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2. Remaining Flaws
While Kaplan’s statute cures some of the defects surrounding the consent and
disclosure provisions, problems still remain. Namely, “what is unreasonable
behavior or unusual risk in one setting or sub-population may not be in another. A
jury of sexually active gay men might see a case differently than a jury of straight
married people.” 138 Individuals vary with respect to how they perceive risk. First,
people regard purely voluntary risks as less threatening. 139 Two people who meet
on an adult dating website and engage in casual sex may regard the risks of their
behavior differently than a juror who would never voluntarily do the same.
Second, when sexual activity is concerned, the degree of risk a person
identifies will vary depending on the information presented to him or her and his or
her understanding of the nature of the relationship involved. 140 For example, the
HIV-positive individual who is familiar with and informed about the “Code of the
Condom” 141 might find the risk of nonconsent lower than the juror who is
unfamiliar with this community norm. Also, an understanding of the complexities
that are embedded in the relationship at issue influences risk perception.
Heightened risk perception may result from the conservative juror’s inability to
understand the complexities of online relationships and community norms.
Because the conservative juror does not understand the nature of these casual,
online sexual relationships, she finds the risk of partner nonconsent greater. Lastly,
studies demonstrate gender differences in risk perception. 142 Women identify risks
as greater and are less willing to tolerate them than men. 143
Therefore, when relying on a juror’s determination of what the defendant
knew, what risks he or she consciously disregarded, and what risks he or she
should have been aware of, how may we bridge the disparity between a defendant
and a juror’s risk evaluation of nonconsent? There are no definitive answers, but
providing the juror with more information is a good starting point. Information can

138

Burris et al., supra note 7, at 509.
David Aldous, Risk to Individuals: Perception and Reality, in ON CHANCE AND
UNPREDICTABILITY: 13/20 LECTURES ON THE LINKS BETWEEN MATHEMATICAL
PROBABILITY AND THE REAL WORLD 53, 56 (2012), available at http://www.stat.berkeley.e
du/~aldous/Real-World/draft_book.pdf.
140
Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1550–51; see also BOURNE ET AL., supra note 44, at 7
(indicating that “[a]fter diagnosis, men’s risk perceptions continue to undergo significant
changes, influenced by their own emotional state, experience, and information gained as
they [made] decisions about being sexually active individuals with HIV”).
141
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
142
Nancy Levit, Confronting Conventional Thinking: The Heuristics Problem in
Feminist Legal Theory, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 391, 424 (2006); see also Paul Slovic, Trust,
Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk Assessment Battlefield, 1997 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 59, 68 (“Several dozen studies have documented the finding that men tend
to judge risks as smaller and less problematic than do women.”).
143
Levit, supra note 142, at 424.
139
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alter judgments about risk. 144 Because familiarity with community conventions
guide individual risk evaluation, it is important to educate the jury on these
community norms.
As exemplified in the above scenarios, the online dating community maintains
its own norms and language that are unlikely to be understood by a community of
traditional jurors. 145 Information about how online community conventions
influence assumptions about partner consent may help bridge the defendant/juror
risk-evaluation gap. Educating the jury about these norms may encourage them to
assign punishment proportionate to a defendant’s blameworthiness. Jury
instructions may be an effective means by which to provide this information. As
the United States Supreme Court has said, “[t]he adversary system, with lay jurors
as the usual ultimate factfinders in criminal prosecutions, has historically permitted
triers of fact to draw on the standards of their community, guided always by
limiting instructions on the law.” 146
3. Model Jury Instruction
In light of the considerations above, this Note proposes the following model
jury instruction:
The prosecution is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant [knew/recklessly disregarded/should have known] [name]
did not consent to the risk of HIV infection. When considering whether
the defendant [knew/recklessly disregarded/should have known] [name]
did not consent to the risk of HIV infection, you are to consider the
totality of the circumstances bearing on the defendant’s degree of
awareness that [name] did not consent to the risk of infection. Consent
need not be verbal in all cases. Consent can only occur nonverbally when
a reliable context otherwise establishes the victim’s consent to the risk of
HIV infection.
Lastly, you are instructed to consider that defendant and [name] met
on an Internet dating website. Like any community, Internet dating
communities have their own unique norms and language you may be
unfamiliar with. You are to consider these factors in determining whether
the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
144

See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Hazard Communication:
Warnings and Risk, 545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 106, 106–07 (1996).
145
“Values in these communities are often formed, reflected and transmitted not only
through traditional institutions of moral influence but also popular culture and social
media. . . . [W]e are [not] . . . members of a single, unified and consciously accepted group
engaged in the common pursuit of our own forms of sexual satisfaction.” Scott Burris &
Matthew Weait, Criminalisation and Moral Responsibility for Sexual Transmission of HIV
5 (Temple U. Beasley Sch. of L. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 201317, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2126714.
146
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973).
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[knew/recklessly disregarded/should have known] [name] did not
consent to the risk of HIV. If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant [knew/recklessly disregarded/should have known]
[name] did not consent to the risk of HIV infection, you must find
defendant not guilty.
The bracketed areas represent the different mental states required147 by the
offense charged. Defense counsel should also be encouraged to request the court to
instruct the jury on lesser included offenses and mistake of fact when applicable.
The instruction is designed to encourage a thoughtful consideration of the various
factors that contributed to the defendant’s determination that his or her partner
consented. It serves briefly to inform jurors about how online daters move within
their own community. Knowledge on this matter reminds the jury to consider the
factors that bear on how an HIV-positive e-dater may evaluate the risk of
nonconsent differently, thereby reducing the risk that a defendant will receive
disproportionate punishment.
Furthermore, it reminds jurors that consent to the risk of HIV infection need
not be verbal. It is the jury’s fact-finding duty to determine if consent to exposure
was in fact communicated contextually. Where it may not be apparent to the jury
that certain situations establish consent by themselves, including this provision in
the instruction serves to remind jurors that acquittal may be warranted when the
exposed party consents—albeit nonverbally—to the risk of HIV infection. As a
result, it decreases the risk that constitutionally protected private, consensual
sexual conduct will become subject to punishment.
As an example, consider again our characters from scenario one, Bob and
Angela. First, the instruction reminds the jury that Angela’s consent to the risk of
HIV exposure could occur nonverbally. However, the jury must first look at the
circumstances, including Bob’s online dating profile that revealed his serostatus,
and determine whether the context met a level of reliability that could establish
Angela’s consent and replace the need for verbal communication. Moreover, by
requesting that the jury consider Internet dating norms, the instruction asks the jury
to examine evidence that might otherwise be dismissed, such as online serosorting
practices. The instruction encourages jurors to examine Bob’s culpability in view
of these norms and to look beyond their own predilections concerning risk and
morality. When a defendant, like Bob, faces charges under an HIV-exposure law
based on sexual conduct with a partner met online, Kaplan’s narrowly tailored
statute, coupled with the model instruction above, minimizes the danger of
disproportionate punishment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law of consent is a legal anomaly. It focuses not only on the defendant’s
state of mind, but also on the victim’s mindset. Or, rather, what the defendant
147

Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1551.
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knew about the victim’s mindset. Consent to HIV exposure is consent to a risk, not
consent to an act. Consent to an act is more outwardly apparent—signals of
nonconsent may include physical resistance, incapacity, signs of emotional
oppression, among others. Consent to a risk, however, is purely subjective.
Accordingly, there is more room for good-faith mistakes vis-à-vis partner consent.
The risk is only exacerbated by the many nonverbal ways in which individuals
negotiate consent and disclosure in the context of sexual relations. Moreover,
assumptions about online dating community norms create an additional layer of
opportunity for good-faith mistakes. The statutes do not accommodate the potential
for mistakes as they fail to provide for the varying degrees of culpability held by a
defendant relative to his or her partner’s consent
The ambiguously drafted HIV-exposure statutes offer no guidance on what
constitutes legally permissible consent and disclosure; courts have yet to require a
verbal mandate nor have they determined whether consent and disclosure may be
inferred from the circumstances. Accordingly, criminal-transmission laws may
touch private, consensual sexual relations—a privacy right protected by the
Constitution. This lack of clarity is particularly problematic in the Internet age
where online dating sites facilitate nonverbal negotiation of disclosure and consent.
With the growing popularity of online dating between HIV-positive
and -negative individuals alike, a greater necessity arises for these ambiguous
statutes to be restructured. Kaplan’s proposed statute rectifies several problems
with these disclosure and consent provisions. However, this statute fails to bridge
the gap that exists between the lay juror’s risk perception and the HIV-positive edater’s risk perception of partner nonconsent. This gap may be bridged by
informing jurors about e-dating community norms under which the HIV-positive
defendant maneuvers. The instruction is designed to encourage a thoughtful
consideration of the online community norms that may contribute to the
defendant’s determination that his partner consented.
In their current state, the disclosure and consent exceptions are flawed.
Regulating behavior as complicated as consensual sexual relations requires careful
statutory construction—especially when technology adds an additional layer of
complexity. The criminal-transmission statutes’ disclosure and consent exceptions
need restructuring to account for these complexities. Structural changes to the
statutory scheme can help rectify these flaws and ensure that only the truly
culpable are convicted. Nearly two decades have passed since these statutes were
first enacted. Since that time, the Internet has dramatically transformed our
behaviors and the ways in which we relate to one another. The HIV-exposure
statutes must be overhauled in light of these changes.

